113, 101, 221, 619, 463 Kurd MAll

[For information on the Kurd see l: Coon, Ml Middle East, cat. 116, pp. 215-217.]

and it is important not to confuse the ideal of the intellectual nationalists, a free Kurdish commonwealth, with that which the chieftains and their people are now striving to preserve, a society quite unlike the state. 121 449

The Kurds, occupying a mountainous terrain, were but superficially governed by the Iranian and Ottoman governments. Inasmuch as the roads were poor or the country impossible for artillery, the Kurds, a well-armed people, were usually the military equals of their governors. The control of the Iranians and Turks was thus largely confined to the maintenance of police posts and army installations and the attempt, often in vain, to maintain public order and collect a few taxes. Helmut von Moltke, writing in 1838, notes: 648 [491]

> It is a well-known fact that the Ottoman empire comprises vast regions in which the Porte exercises no real authority. It is certain that the Padishah (the Turkish Sultan) has to reconquer widespread regions within the territory of his own state. To this category belong the highlands (of Kurdistan) between the Tigris and the Persian frontier.[1]

In recent decades, however, the Kurds, notably in Iraq and Turkey, have been subjected to the full impact of the modern state and some remarkable changes, comparable to similar developments elsewhere in the Middle East, are beginning to take place, challenging the whole structure of their society. This last, as will be seen, is one which is at once tribal and feudal, formerly directed by a landed aristocracy. A 177 619

[1] Quoted in Sebastian, 1948, p. 30.

characteristic of it was its extreme decentralization. The Kurdish tenant or tribesman has now suddenly discovered himself to be a citizen, and the Kurdish chieftain to be without his former economic or political power. A new class, that of officials and officers, has been introduced with an unfamiliar system of society, and the result has not been without conflict. The fact that the reaction has been linked with European nationalism makes it the more interesting. The second object of this study is the delineation of this collision, and a consideration of the alterations in Kurdish life since Ottoman times. The recognition that nationalism, commonly considered in the Middle East as a European ideology in new dress, may be paired in some instances with economic and social upheavals of a different order is a matter of great importance in the analysis of the area.

The Kurdish population of Iraq has been estimated at about 400,000, although figures vary considerably, and occupies the mountainous areas north of Mosul, northeast of Erbil, and east of Kirkuk. In many instances their villages have spilled out on the flat expanses of Upper Mesopotamia. A small portion of this populace is nomadic, wintering their flocks in the same plains area, and seeking the pastures of the uplands in the summer. Kurdish Iraq provides a striking contrast to the sun-baked flats and deserts of the central and southern provinces. The terrain is rugged, with peaks reaching 8000 feet above sea level, and is characterized by precipitous heights, deep gorges,

Unlike many Kurdish and Nestorian villagers, as well as the people of Rowandus itself, the Ketchig all belong to one or another "tribe" (Kurdish, 'ashirat, from Arabic, 'ashira), a matter which also demands clarification. The typical Kurdish tribe contains several elements of a different character. Membership usually depends upon descent, but individual families or much larger groups can deny their tribal allegiance, and either join another group, or form an individual tribe of their own. While some of the larger confederations appear to be of considerable antiquity, the smaller groups come and go with the vicissitudes of war, wealth, and leadership. Nor are the tribes made up exclusively of nomads, for, while the nomad may play a dominant role in furnishing pugnacious leadership and armed men, the wealth and numerical strength of such a group come largely from its villagers. Because many of the chieftains are landowners, persons living in villages owned by them, whether Muslim Kurds or Nestorian Christians, are said to "belong" to the chieftain's tribe. Nestorians often dress in the typical garb of their "tribe," taking part in many of its common affairs, although there is almost no possibility of intermarriage between them and their Muslim fellows. While there seems to be little historical evidence to support or refute such a view, the Kurdish tribe appears to represent an intermediate stage between groups whose membership was actually based on descent and those whose character is purely feudal, a situation which may have

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existed for centuries. Today it cannot be denied that some tribesmen, particularly the Kotshir, belong to their group because of kinship relation (the Kurdish term tayfa, from Arabic, ta'ifa, "tribe," is used to describe a tribal subdivision still to be found which seems to represent a patrilineal clan), while at the same time it is perfectly clear that a great deal of membership is simply territorial.

It is important to notice that there are two main bodies of criminal law in Iraq, a civil code administered by judges appointed by the Ministry of Justice, and that commonly called "tribal law," executed by local administrative officers. The institution of dual legal systems was evoked by the existence of Arab and Kurdish tribes some of whose time-honored customs were, to say the least, out of joint with the provisions of a modern, quasi-European code. The differences between the two need not be considered in detail. In general, "tribal" law is more lenient in some respects, as in "justifiable" homicide (disposing of an erring female relative), and more stringent in others, such as adultery or rape. There are in the Rowanduz district a number of groups who can have recourse to tribal law, and its administration is not charged to the local judge, but is an added task of the qaimmaqam. Hence the office of that official in Rowanduz has often the aspect of a courtroom, the qaimmaqam and his clerk patiently and laboriously inquiring into the intricacies of some rural feud through an interminable parade of witnesses--scarcely-dressed

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kotshir and hillmen from remote villages--sworn in on a cloth-covered Quran for their long-winded depositions. In the event that a chieftain has appeared, usually to palliate any offense which may have taken place within his grounds or to vouch for a suspect, the little shayihana or tea-shop [265] across from the government building is full of his body-guards, and a current of excitement runs through the town.

619 ● Those tribes having connections in the Rowandus district, while not necessarily confined to it, include the Balaki under Mulla Musa Agha, the Baradost under Mahmud Beg Khalifa Samid, the Harki under Fatah Agha, the Haruti under Hajji Huway Agha, the Khaylani under Selim Agha, the Mansal under Mahammad Sayidi, the Sarhati under Fatah Agha, and the Surchi under Kadhir Agha. The most important and numerous are the Balaki, the Baradost, the Harki, and the Surchi. Most of these have a network of lesser divisions, 622 corresponding usually to lesser chieftains. It will be 619 seen later that a chieftain need have no connection with a tribe to enjoy the rank. There are, to be sure, two views of the canon of tribes and their leaders, that of the government and that of the local inhabitants. The list given here is that officially furnished by the qaiba of Rowandus, and does not necessarily correspond with some segments of local opinion, for, on the one hand, certain "lawful" chieftains may be exiled, imprisoned, or unrecognized, while others, such as As'ad Agha who keeps to a well-guarded house in Rowandus, are unable to return to their villages [628] because of a feud.

because of a feud. Lastly it remains to mention the Barzani, formerly one of the most powerful groups in the district. In the series of events which followed the withdrawal of the Russian army from Azerbaijan in 1946, one of the Barzani chieftains, Mulla Mustafa, was forced to flee to the Armenian S.S.R. and the tribe was theoretically broken up. Officially the Barzani no longer exist, but in the popular mind they are much alive. If a policeman or another is shot in a remote district, the deed is usually attributed to "the Barzani," a convenient testimony for the qaimmaqam's court.

The administrative control of an extensive mountainous area inhabited by a scattered population of some 55,000 poverty-stricken farmers and shepherds, most of whom belong to an ethnic group noted for its unruliness, is not without its difficulties, and requires of the qaimmaqam and his officials the extensive daily exhibition of qualities, among them unlimited patience and a fine sense for popular opinion, rarely demanded of similar magistrates in Europe or North America. Locally, in the nahiya, the greater part of the burden rests almost completely with the mudir and his several assistants, for within his own sphere he is given much of a free rein. It has been often and widely noticed that bureaucratic personnel in the Middle East far tend to outnumber and submerge the requirements of efficiency, but this is valid only for capitals and larger towns, for the distasteful tasks of rural order find but the barest of cadre. The

example, an Arab of Mosul and one of Baghdad, but it does not appear to be of a serious nature. Among the Kurds, one can often hear the native of a certain locale praising it to the exclusion of others. "The preparation of rice at Sulaymaniya is the best," a Kurd of this city proclaims in a discussion of cookery, but feelings of this type do not operate to separate the people in any important way, because religious and ethnic divisions have much greater weight. On the other hand, tribal allegiance in certain rural areas has great importance, although increased government control in matters such as the vendetta has mitigated their character to some extent. It is difficult to formulate any general rules for tribal exogamy or endogamy, because the chieftains often intermarry with aristocratic houses of the same standing, regardless of tribe. The tendency among most tribesmen, Kurd or Arab, is toward marriage within their own group, because the preferential match is between cousins.

In the other divisions of society, two parallel systems, at many points intermingled, are to be found. In the first of these there is a simple division between a hereditary aristocracy and a mass of commoners and this system is primitive or quasi-primitive. Save for Kurdistan and certain areas held by groups such as the Chaldaeans, the Mandaeans, or the Yezidis, much of Iraq has been partitioned for centuries among Arab tribes. The chieftains of these tribes and their subdivisions are aristocrats who inherit their position in the paternal

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beggar who, among other things, performed such feats as eating pebbles for alms in the <u>qhaykhanas</u>, as well as in one of the best-educated men of the community.

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Turning to the Rowanduz district, it is possible to illustrate and to amplify these general remarks. First, there is a landed, hereditary aristocracy of Kurds. As far as one can gather from the meager histories of the area, the Kurds had been ruled by independent or semi-independent chieftains for an unknown period until Ottoman and Iranian power was able to extend its rule over them. This control, usually superficial, was never solidified until after the first World War. As rulers, the Kurdish chieftains led their people in war, arbitrated their quarrels, and, to some extent, directed their economy. In return for these things, they laid claim to a certain share of annual produce, animals or harvest. In some cases the chieftainship appears to have had certain demo-cratic aspects, the new ruler, characteristically, but not necessarily, the eldest son of the deceased, selected from a noble household by an assembly of the tribesmen. In others it was purely aristocratic. As has been seen above, chieftains are many times associated with tribes, that is to say, there is no tribe without such a leader, but other-wise they are feudal overlords. Often a chieftain can be both the head of a tribal group and the "owner" of non-tribal lands and villages. The tenure of property illustrates this. Sometimes the land and flocks are owned by the

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tribal group as a whole from which the chieftain is "granted" his yearly share, while in other cases they are his personal possessions, inherited through the noble family, which he can dispose of as he pleases. It appears that a stage between tribal and feudal society is represented here, a combination of both systems which may have existed in this way for centuries, and which is largely primitive in character. 423 619 622 565

The aristocratic Kurdish households are, in fact, extended patrilineal families for which the term is _familiya_, puzzling in its similarity to the Latin _familia_. The same noun is sometimes applied to houses of great wealth and numbers, but this seems to be comparatively rare. Only these households and _sayyids_, descendants of the tribe of the Prophet, keep genealogies (_sajara_, from Arabic _shajara_, "tree"). In the case of the _sayyid_ the title can be inherited on either side, but the patent of nobility is solely patrilineal. One of the tests of nobility is said to be the ability to name one's patrilineal forebears to seven generations, and no one in Rowanduz, outside of these families, is able to perform this feat. The titles of the nobility include _beg_, _agha_, and _mir_, all of Turkish derivation. In Ottoman times _pasha_ was also in use, and the grandfather of Isma'il Beg was called "Abdullah Pasha." The Arabic _shaykh_, literally, "old man," appears, as in such distinguished Kurdish figures as Shaykh Mahmud, leader of the revolts in 1922 and 1930, and Shaykh Taha, 565 596 [173] 611 565 565 554

upper class in the second system, is unnecessary for this group. Ra'uf Effendi, for example, cannot read or write, although he can sign his name and speaks four languages fluently. It is with these "genteel" commoners that there is intermarriage among the aristocracy, although commoners can never attain the rank of a chieftain. The bases of the class are either wealth or literacy. A mulla can be extremely poor and still enjoy the distinction. It might be mentioned that the lowest class of civil servants, the clerks, as well as Christians and Jews, if wealthy, are addressed by the same term elsewhere in Iraq. A teacher, however, does not always like to be called effendi because he has had a college or university education, and, no matter how poorly paid, belongs to the educated upper class of the second system.

Rowanduz is non-tribal and does not, as a whole, owe allegiance to any particular chieftain, although the House of Isma'il Beg owns a great part of the town. "We do not belong to tribes," Ra'uf Effendi explained, "although perhaps our ancestors did, but we have no knowledge of them." Persons of the lower classes, transients or migrants from the villages, may, of course, retain such affiliations. In Ottoman times, Rowanduz enjoyed an independence, just as it does today, from tribal or feudal obligations. The wealthy merchants of the town, particularly those engaged in the lucrative caravan trade with Iran, were called chalabis, another Turkish term for "gentlemen,"

the wives of other officials, although this is far from a common practice. The wife of an official can be extremely lonely as far as feminine companionship is concerned. Townswomen of the lower classes suffer no such inconveniences, and associate with each other with great freedom. There is a mosque for women alone in the town, frequented by those of the lower classes, and is said by the townsmen to be used more as a clearing-house for idle talk than for pious exercises.

If the society of adults in Rowanduz has its hierarchy, there is a very real, but short-lived, democracy for the children. The youngsters of all, officials, aristocrats, and townspeople, play with each other without any reference to the ranks of their parents, and choose their leaders in the same way. The son of a servant can be "chieftain" over his fellows, and the daughter of a laborer the arbiter of her playmates. This stage passes without any apparent difficulty as the exigencies of life call them to different tasks, some to school and others to work in their fathers' shops. New friendships, better fitted to the demands of relative status, replace those of childhood. It need not be thought, however, that these early alliances do not extend into later life, although such acquaintances do not visit each other's homes.

In concluding this section, it is possible to relate the society of Rowanduz not only to that of the town in Ottoman times, but to Iraq and the Middle East at large, and to present several observations of some importance.

heart of the matter is to be found in the distinction 619 648
een a society governed by the state and one ruled by
al or feudal chieftains. The state is no stranger to
area of the Middle East, for it was in this province [174]
it probably made its first appearance and some of
more complex bureaucracies of history were evolved.
rtheless, there are certain places, Kurdistan among
, where it is a newcomer, and others, such as Saudi
ia, where it has yet to appear. Ottoman control in
istan was rarely strong, and was characterized by a
of daily contest between the scattered authorities,
orted by their troops and gendarmes, and the local
abitants in matters of tax-collection and recruitment
the army. Beyond the borders of Turkey and other well-
anized districts, the Ottoman Empire was largely oriented
tribute, the enrichment of its officers and the Sub-
Porte, and the Turks, aside from their inroads and
prestige attached to conquerors, did little to tamper
h the economy and the social structure of their sub-
ts. Rowanduz, before the first World War, was led by
aristocrats and its merchants, and the meager represen-
ion of Ottoman rule was regarded as an everyday annoy-
e which could be circumvented, bribed, or ambushed as
occasion demanded. Insofar as the Turks were satisfied [609]
h what little money and recruits they were able to collect,
y were not considered greatly detrimental to life.

The rise of the modern state in Iraq provides in 177 619 648
ces such as Rowanduz, good examples of the impingement

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of a new system of society on one that is older. At the beginning of this section, these two systems were outlined, the "primitive" one headed by a hereditary aristocracy and the "civilized" one by an educated group which includes property-owners, professional men, and a government cadre. The first is represented in the Rowanduz district by the Kurdish chieftains and the second by the officials and officers of the central government. The second system is not wholly strange to the area, for the Turks, and perhaps others before them, conditioned the Kurdish populace to the concept of alien rule, if such control was only desultory. The new monarchy, however, first in British and later in Arab hands, introduced a strong administration, something quite new, which, despite a series of revolts, penetrated almost all phases of popular life. This, as has been seen, has resulted in the displacement of the local aristocracy, a process which has been completed in some places and in others is only beginning. The same conflict, with varying results, can be observed elsewhere in Iraq and in the Middle East. Among the "Marsh Arabs" of the southern provinces, for example, there is a bitter conflict between the local shaykhs and the government in matters of land ownership and the collection of taxes. The "Marsh Arabs" also have a record of revolt, and, like the Kurds, have had many of their chieftains imprisoned or exiled, such as Shaykh Salim of the Bani As'ad tribe, still in exile at Baquba.

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was in reality that of a tribute empire, concerned with 648
the collection of taxes and recruits. Even in those two
last tasks there was a contest, often in good humor, be-
tween the governors and the governed, and the victories
were divided. As long as money and men were in reasonably
good evidence, the Turks left the Kurds to their own
devices. They handed down justice of a sort, but most [691]
quarrels never reached their courts. They were not partic-
ularly concerned with homicide, insofar as the murdered
party was not a Turk, and, above all, they did not tamper
with the economic structure of society. The bulk of the [651]
taxes were collected, in the best way possible, from the
chieftains and landowners, never from the farmers and
shepherds. The Kurds regarded these taxes, when they
were forced to pay them, as a sort of levy to some superior
chieftain. Matters of education or public health received [658]
little attention. This does not mean that in certain [744]
other areas of the Ottoman Empire there was not a complex
bureaucratic government, but in Kurdistan it may be
summed up as little more than desultory control. The
gentle character of this administration, compared with that
of today, is indicated by the fact that many Kurds look
back with nostalgia to the "freedom" of Ottoman times.

In ethnological theory the significant difference 121
between primitive and civilized society is held to have its 619
basis in economics. Membership in a primitive society is
defined in terms of kinship relation, usually by "blood,"

and larger confederations of kinship groups are articulated with a similar phraseology. The Kurdish tribe, which has not been extensively discussed, represents in large part such a unit. The lands of the tribe, agricultural or pastoral, are the property of kinship groups, extended patrilineal families, as are the flocks and herds, and an individual cannot alienate them in quantity without difficulty. Chieftainship is hereditary, commonly with the democratic approval of the men of the tribe. Some chieftains are undistinguished from their tribesmen save in the size of their families' holdings, and others receive a customary share of the annual produce. The Kurdish tribe, then, is traditionally an alliance of extended patrilineal families, sometimes with the fiction of a common ancestor, and membership in the tribe depends on membership in the family, a matter of "blood" descent. Tribal life is directed by the chieftain, and the murder of a member or the theft of property by an outsider is never permitted to go unavenged.

619 [121] [423] [622] [628]

Feudalism, an arrangement different than that of the tribe, requires no redefinition here. It is a personal exchange of duties between landlord and tenant, and is not represented in the Rowanduz district by the nomads whose society is exclusively tribal. It seems to have arisen in two ways, in the first of which the chieftains of nomadic groups took agricultural villages under their protection. One might remark again that the nomad, because of his mobility and firepower, has a military advantage over the villager. In the second, some powerful families, by the

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Between these dates there were many other incidents, for example, the assassination of the dictator of Iraq, General Sidqi, by a Kurd in 1937. In neighboring countries, there was a general insurrection of the Kurds in Turkey in 1925 and one in Syria in 1937. The revolt in Iraq in 1930 was common to Turkey and Iran, and that of Mulla Mustafa to Iraq and Iran. All of these were put down with difficulty, and demanded the use of aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, and, in some cases, European troops. The states were often aided by quarrels among the Kurdish chieftains. It is interesting that the Kurds regard these conflicts with the government in the same light as tribal warfare of the type which arises from the vendetta. It has been noted how brigands and other outlaws frequently have their own private blood feuds with the authorities. Mulla Mustafa was largely driven from Iraq, not by the army, but by Mahmud Beg of the Baradost who had a personal grudge against the Barzani chief and his followers.

In order to appreciate the place of Rowanduz in this process, it is necessary to review its position. The town, as has been said, is non-tribal and, although the House of Isma'il Beg owns much of its property, is not ruled by any overlord. In this way it has been assimilated without difficulty into the economic system of the state, as opposed to that of the tribe or feudalism. All of its lands have been surveyed and classified, and the taxes are collected directly from the inhabitants. As an administrative center

it has had a new class added to its society, that of the officials and officers, and, more than any agricultural village, has been absorbed into an unfamiliar system. The government elite of the town are on an equal footing, as far as prestige is concerned, with the local aristocracy and enjoy the advantage of having the real power. Already certain changes, which might have been anticipated, are beginning to take place. A few merchants in the town have adopted the European dress of the official class, and men are determined that their sons, if humanly possible, will be educated and take a higher place in the new hierarchy of society, something previously impossible. It is in Rowanduz, then, that a new social structure is being realized as it is elsewhere, for example, among the Marsh Arabs of the southern provinces. It is one of the state of Iraq, rather than the tribal and feudal system which is characterized by the absolute difference between aristocrat and commoner. At present, the contest between the government and the Kurdish nobility has only been partially decided, but, failing some major event, it seems probable that the Kurdish chieftains will be eliminated as a distinctive class and be able to save themselves only as landowners and participants in the new regime.

The relevance of the second object of this study to ethnology is not that it has formulated something new or unique, but that it supplements the large body of material already gathered on the transition of primitive into

3: Barth E-5 (1951) 1954 MA11 Kurd MA11

and in the same area possibly also among some Caucasian groups.[4] However, though marriage patterns do not function to define the relations between lineages, this does not assume that marriage relations and maternal ties have indeed no relevance of a structural or specifically political nature. The present paper presents an hypothesis regarding these implications in the Kurdish lineage organization, specifically the meaning of a pattern of father's brother's daughter marriage, for the consideration of students working with similar problems in the Middle East.

Features of Kurdish culture and society have been described elsewhere,[5] but might be summarized briefly. The Kurds are a linguistic and ethnic group, nearly exclusively Moslem by religion, totalling some three million people.[6] They occupy a semi-continuous territory along the hills and mountains east and north of the Fertile Crescent, divided between the modern states of Persia, Iraq, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., and Syria. Some few groups of Kurds have remained nomadic till the present day, following their herds of sheep, goats, and large cattle into the mountains in the summer and down on the plains in the winter. The great majority are today subsistence farmers, many of whom practice a pattern of localized transhumance. The present discussion relates to the southern districts of Iraq Kurdistan, where material was collected in the field from February to August, 1951.

Two basic types of organization were found: a tribal system, based on descent, and a feudal system, based on class and land ownership. The latter is progressively becoming assimilated into the modern structure of the state of Iraq; the former, a patrilineal lineage system, survives only among the nomads and a minority of the farmers in the more isolated territories.

Kurdish tribal organization is a segmentary lineage organization of very simple type. The largest kinship unit, the *tira*, is a maximal lineage, divisible into segments according to the charter of patrilineal descent. The genealogical depth of the tira varies. For the sedentary Hamawands (location: Kirkuk Liwa, Iraq), the apical ancestor is nine generations removed from the present adult generation; for the nomadic Wurda Shatri (location: centering in Suleimani Liwa, Iraq), twelve generations.

Several tiras may be united, though not necessarily, in a political confederacy of variable endurance, the most important in southern Kurdistan being at present

4 Louis J. Luzbetak, *Marriage and the Family in Caucasia* (Vienna, 1951).

5 V. F. Minorsky, "Kurds and Kurdistan" (in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, London, 1913); E. R. Leach, *Social and Economic Organization of the Rowanduz Kurds* (Monographs in Social Anthropology, no. 3, London, 1940); Frederik Barth, *Principles of Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan* (Universitetets Etnografiske Museum, Bulletin no. 7, Oslo, 1953).

6 *The Middle East* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1950).

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

permutations of pan-Kurdish institutions, or traits derived from the specific setting and history of the particular village.

No one of these villages, however, is self-contained. Though each shows a high degree of self-sufficiency and endogamy, it is tied to others in a web of social relations, embracing the whole of Southern Kurdistan. Many institutions affecting large districts have their main focus in one or another of these local vilages, not visibly different from the next: the home village of the leader of the derwish brotherhood, that of a tribal leader, a rich landowner, a locally important mullah. Ordinary trade ties village to village and village to city; illegal tobacco trade follows back roads and high mountain passes in a web of its own. Thus no village is self-contained or seperable in structural terms. Clearly, a larger unit of study than any one village is needed.

But as soon as one proceeds beyond the village level, complications arise. Social relations within the village are virtually continuous, and a constant set of relations and hierarchy of organization persists, or changes only slowly. Relations outside the village, on the other hand, are *discontinuous*. In such relations, there is a stronger tendency to press any immediate advantage to the limit. To this end, the individual attempts to manipulate a variety of competing institutions and norms, derived from tribal Kurdish, purely local, Arabic, Islamic, Persian, «modern» etc. cultural contexts. On the other hand, to give these relations the degree of permanence that they do have, some generally accepted principle must exist, or the social relations would break down (as they in fact do in the case of feud). — An attempt will be made to unravel the institutionalized forms that these inter-village relations take.

The internal organization of the village presents problems of a different kind. The great differences between villages make it meaningless to construct an average «typical» or «modal» type of village organization. They may be classified according to type, the basic dichotomy being between those of freeholding, tribally organized farmers, and those of non-tribal, sharecropping tenants. But rather than construct an arbitrary number of types, it seems more fertile to exploit the existing diversity to discover co-variance of

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

institutional forms. Thereby the structural connections between various institutions and principles of organization should become clearer. It will be found that the principles that serve to organize the village are to large extent the same as those which are applied in the more inclusive systems of organization.

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7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

Chapter II.

Formal political organization

619 The preceeding chapter has dealt with some basic factors in the culture and social organization of the settled population of Southern Kurdistan, essentially uniform over the whole area. Political organization, on the other hand, shows great regional variation, the *tribal* types being built on the lineage principle (cf. p. 10), others disregarding descent in a non-tribal, *feudal* organization, which is based on residential groups only.

The Kurdish application of the principle of patrilineal descent in organizing the largely endogamous descent groups, or lineages, in a larger political structure, will be discussed first with respect to the nomadic *Jaf* group. The organization of the settled *Hemawand* agriculturalists is essentially similar, and demonstrates the tendency toward segmentation, especially visible where such a lineage organization is found among settled villagers. These tribal systems are contrasted with the formal organization of the non-tribal villages of the Suleimani area. Some uniform principles are found in all types of Kurdish political organization; these will be discussed, and an attempt will be made to show how they operate in a more extensive and segmentary feudal type of organization.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE *JAF*.[1]

The Jaf is a powerful federation of tribes, until recently almost wholly nomadic, and still counting among its members a majority of

[1]) For data on Jaf organization, I am indebted to the Jaf *Begs* of Halebja and to the *Reiz* of the Wurda Shatri tira.

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MAll Kurd MAll

the nomads in the South Kurdish area. Their traditions place their origins in the *Djouro* area of Persian Kurdistan, where in fact some 10—12 Jaf tribes still live. About 250 years ago, the tensions between the *Shi'i* Persian government and the *Sunni* Jaf precipitated conflict, and the tribes which refused subjection were unable to defend themselves, and fled across the border to the *Sunni* Ottoman Empire. This group of migrants is said to have counted some 500 families. They were given pastures close to the Persian frontier, which they in turn served to protect. As a result of natural growth, and by assimilation of small and broken tribes into their organization, the group grew to the present total of some 60,000 persons. Up till 35—40 years ago, they had remained nomadic. At the present time the nomadic section makes up only a small fraction of the total, numbering some 2—3000 individuals.

The annual migration of the nomadic Jaf carries them ca. 250 km. from their winter camps on the plains to the summer pastures in the high mountains. Unlike the otherwise similar Central Asiatic nomads, the Jaf have no permanent houses for winter use, but live in their black tents all year. Agricultural pursuits are rare, and generally only involve hiring a man to raise a crop of grain, or renting out oxen to the farmers. More typically, the economy is purely pastoral.

ASHIRET. There is some vagueness as to the Kurdish classification of the Jaf unit. If one asks a solitary Jaf to what tribe, *tira*, he belongs, he will tend to answer Jaf. On the other hand, Jaf informants outlining the political structure were unwilling to use the term *tira* for the whole group, and preferred to reserve it for the next smaller unit: the various sections making up the Jaf group. Usually the Arabic term *Ashiret* was preferred, having reference both to a people and to an area (cf. Leach, op.cit., p. 13). Obviously, this is a slight misapplication, considering that the nomadic Jaf share their area with a number of other groups. Due to the above mentioned historical process of growth by assimilation, the Jaf today constitute a federation of groups of diverse origin. They themselves make the distinction between «true» Jaf and later associated groups, but have no special term or organization for the «true» Jaf.

For lack of a better term, the Jaf confederacy as a whole should

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MAll Kurd MAll

then probably be called an *ashiret*. This *ashiret* is ruled by a recognized leader, the *Beg* or *Pasha*. He is the head of the «royal» family, the *Begzada*. The size of the *ashiret* unit was considerable, even before sections of it became sedentary. In 1820, while still entirely nomadic, the Jaf could muster 1000 infantry and 300 horses, and were said to number several thousand families (Rich op. cit., p. 280, conflicting with his statement on p. 112).

TIRA. The Jaf *ashiret* is divided into a number of tribes, *tiras*. The various lists of these component *tiras* conflict slightly in names and total numbers, but a characteristic enumeration of Jaf *tiras* is:

(1) Shatri group:
  Warda (little) Shatri
  Mirwaisi
  Hse-i-Ibrahim
  Jusuf-djani
  Bawa-djani
  Kamali
(2) Harsni
(3) Sadani
(4) Badakhi
(5) Galali
(6) Tarkhani
(7) Baghzadi
(8) Maqsjali
(9) Amala
(10) Hse-i-Jarwais
(11) Shaikh 'Ismail:
  Shaikh 'Ismail
  Benadjat.

The *tira* is the primary political group and landowning unit. Membership in a *tira* is patrilineally inherited, and the *tira* itself approximates a maximal lineage. But though all members of the *tira* should be able to trace patrilineal descent from one common ancestor, it may frequently become difficult to document the connection between some of the major kinship segments in any one *tira*. And, on the other hand, every maximal lineage is not automatically regarded a *tira*; the concept is fundamentally based on political criteria and assumes a functioning organization.

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

609 This whole framework of formal organization may be diagramatically illustrated as below, Diagram 3.


Formerly one or two PASHAS heads
of the BEGZADA lineage and leaders of the Jaf confederacy
PYSHTMALA
Bodyguards & servants, recruited from all Jaf tiras.
TIRA,
the maximal lineage, led by a RAIZ headman, who is also the head of his own
KHEL
the migratory unit composed of numerous HOUSEHOLDS each in separate tents.
KHEL
KHEL
other migratory units of the same tira. Each lead by an informal headman subject to the Raiz.
TIRA
TIRA
numerous tiras, formally connected through the Begzada only except where common descent is traced.
Hired HERDSMEN of foreign descent, residing with the khel, but without political power.

Diagram No. 3. Formal organization of the nomadic Jaf.

686 233 609 233 Within the *khel*, wealth, primarily in the form of herds, is the main source of power. Any member of the *tira* has unlimited grazing rights for his flocks, so there is no legal limit to the accumulation of wealth. The cattle are herded in flocks of 500 or so, with one herdsman for each flock. Herdsmen are preferably hired among the poor people of the *tira*, or they may be «foreigners» associated with the *khel* purely because of their economic functions. The typical pattern is to exploit poor relatives for this purpose, a practice familiar from Central Asiatic nomads (e. g. Hudson, 1938, p. 57). Self-

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MAll Kurd MAll

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE HAMAWAND.

According to their own traditions, the Hamawands entered Southern Kurdistan from Persia as nomadic herdsmen. Seeing the opportunities offered by the ineffectual nature of Ottoman governmental control, they entered on a career of brigandage, looting the caravans that passed between Persia and Iraq. The uneasy relations between the Persian and Ottoman empires made this all the more feasible, since any activity detrimental to one power had the covert support of the other. Though the Hamawands later settled in villages, they did not immediately take up agriculture, except for small garden patches of melons etc. As they proudly assert: «For more than a generation we reaped our daily bread with our gunbarrels». All accounts by early travellers describe how this small group terrorized the district by striking quickly and effectively in widely separated areas. Only after the First World War did their economy become truly based on farming. Through this turbulent history, tribal political organization retained its importance, and some features of the system may be seen very clearly.

The Hamawand group as a whole is regarded as one *tira* of the same magnitude as the various component Jaf *tiras*. Even in its greatest period of glory, the Hamawand *tira* could muster no more than 200-300 horsemen, implying a total population of 1,000-1,500 individuals. The process of branching has however been initiated; in fact, as compared to the Jaf, the Hamawand political structure seems to be based on a clearer political recognition of the segmentation into lineage sections which follows from the marriage pattern. The hierarchy of progressively more inclusive lineage segments, from the single village level (population 50—100) and up to the maximal lineage group, is given political significance.

There is no single leader of the whole Hamawand *tira*[1]); questions concerning the group as a whole are discussed and decided in a council made up of the *Aghas* (=headmen) of the 4 primary branches. Each of these branches are again divided into sub-branches,

[1]) Actually, Mohammed Amin Agha of the *Begzade* claims paramount position.

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

Unless a certain sum of money is paid, all young male citizens of Iraq are liable to two years of military training and service. This is much resented by most villagers, and they attempt to avoid being called up. According to the *Merkjin*, the Hamawands have an arrangement with the police whereby they give the names of all *Merkjin* men in the two village who are liable for such service, in return for being left in peace themselves. Thus, it is said, the fighting strength of the *Merkjin* is constantly kept down.

The *Merkjin*, on the other hand, are accused of manipulating the religious brotherhood of Derwishes for political purpose, so as to organize all the *Merkjin* of the neighboring villages in a movement of resistance. To counteract this influence, the Hamawand *Agha* is at pains to expose the derwishes as fraudulent, and attempts to enhace the position of the local mullah, the recognized leader of the local mosque. — The final verdict, however, rests with the Land Settlement Commision, an institution the integrity of which few persons choose to question.

The rigidity of the Kurdish tribal system is here clearly illustrated, and might profitably be contrasted to that of the Nuer, as described by Evans-Pritchard (1940). The Nuer have, in spite of extensive conquests and various vicissitudes, retained a system of patrilineal exogamous lineages as the basis of their political organization. These lineages however are *not* corporate localized groups, but are conceptually identified with certain areas, where they tend to form the organizing core of the local villages. Through a system of adoption of conquered Dinka tribesmen to specific lineages, and by reckoning descent through females, a larger community is built around this core, based on «sociological» kinship. Among the Kurds, on the other hand, the general practice of FaBrDa marriage and other close family endogamy makes any initial *rapprochement* impossible between conqueror and conquered, and encourages caste separation. Furthermore, kinship through female links is given no political recognition. The principle of «sociological» kinship is unfamiliar and would be in conflict with Islamic doctrine — the kinship terminology describes actual, genealogical distance, and practices of adoption into lineages would be unacceptable. The only way two groups could fuse in the

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

tribal system would be by demonstrating (or inventing) genealogical connection. This can hardly be done on any grand scale where common residence is virtually impossible, except as based on a relationship of conqueror and conquered.

As a result, the Kurdish tribal village retains a high degree of lineage unity, reckoned strictly patrilineally, as compared to Nuer villages. The Kurd who leaves his tribal territory, or even village, can obtain no political power in his new environment, therefore has minimal prestige, and thus tends to remain with his lineage group. But because of this, the Kurdish lineage system has not the adaptability of the Nuer system, and breaks down in a situation of conquest or external administration.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BABAN POLITICAL STRUCTURE

In the light of these miniature examples from Hamawand territory today, some of the characteristics of the old Baban rule become much clearer. The Baban themselves were not a *tira*, but a «royal» lineage of the same type as the Jaf *Begzada*, ultimately derived from the *Sekkir tira* of the Pushdir area. Their power, however was based on the tribally organized groups, and a majority of the villages seem to have been controlled in the fashion of the above Hamawand villages, with a basic split between a ruling, tribally organized «soldier» caste and a non-tribal peasant population. This separation was clearly recognized by Rich in 1820, and in his lists of the populations of the Pashalik, only the Pushdir area is described as wholly tribal, the «other districts are mixed. Some inhabitants are of the peasant, some of the clanniah race (= tribally organized), i. e., no village has inhabitants of one exclusive kind.» (Rich op. cit., p. 280). The tribally organized minority was employed by the Pashas to control the larger population: «. . . it would never do for him (Omar Agha, one of the feudal lords under the Pasha) to keep the citizen or peasant caste in his service. They never grow much attached, nor will they stand by you in any difficulties. The clansman (= tribal Kurd), on the contrary, though not of your own clan (= *tira*), grows warmly attached to you; and then neither hunger, thirst,

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

7

The Nomads. In addition to the permanent settled inhabitants of the three areas here discussed there are certain nomadic groups who move seasonally from one area to another and even out of the district altogether. These nomads are again in many respects a distinct cultural group; their economy is based exclusively on pastoralism as opposed to the pastoral-agriculturalism of the settled peoples. The largest of the nomad tribes are the Herki. They are normally resident in Persia near the southernmost end of Lake Urmia. These high altitudes cannot provide sufficient fodder for their herds throughout the year and during the late autumn the bulk of the tribe migrates down the Rowandus river and spreads out through the foothills (Area B) and the northern fringe of the plains. They return to Persia with the melting of the snows in the late spring. I have no first hand evidence concerning these people and the second hand evidence appears to be both fabulous and contradictory. There is reason to think that their tribal organisation at the present time functions more perfectly than that of the settled groups, presumably owing to less government interference. They possess definite grazing rights in certain areas, even in districts nominally under the control of settled groups* though in other areas they pay some sort of rental for the right to herd their flocks. Their migration is linked with important trade activities. They bring salt with them from Persia to Iraq, and take back wheat and barley. Wool is disposed of on the Erbil market as well as large numbers of their livestock. The duty-free import of salt is of course strictly illegal but is winked at by the authorities. It was reported in the summer of 1938 that the Persian authorities intended to compel the Herki to adopt a settled habitat. It is thus unlikely that it will ever be possible to determine the precise position of this group in the political and economic organisation of the Kurdish area as a whole.

101 221 184 [235] [439]

In my field work I stayed nearly all the time in villages occupied by members of the Soran and Balik tribes (see Map 2).

[114]

*The Iraq government authorities are able to carry on all negotiations with the Herki through the agency of a single paramount Agha, this despite the fact that the tribe itself scatters into small family groups throughout a very wide area; this seems to imply a high degree of tribal integration. During the summer of 1938 a law case was proceeding between the Agha paramount of the Herki and Jemil Agha of Bahrika (Gerdi tribe) as to whether the former need pay any rent to the latter for the grazing rights of what appeared to be Gerdi land. Jemil Agha complained to me bitterly that the Herki seemed likely to win their case owing to their greater wealth and resources for corruption. The case however establishes the point that they might claim traditional grazing rights in land seemingly within the sphere of influence of permanently settled groups.

619 628 635

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

CHAPTER 2

Political Structure **Definition of Units**

The Kurdish term which in the foregoing pages I have crudely described as tribe is Ashiret. *The name of the Ashiret describes at once the people and the land they occupy. Thus it is sensible to speak of 'Balik country' as a district on the map while the individual tribesman will describe himself as 'a Balik'. 619 •

An ashiret may consist of one or more patrilineal clans called taifa, the fundamental difference between the two being that whereas ashiret is essentially descriptive of a political group, taifa is descriptive of a kinship group. Thus in Balik there are three taifa usually known as Mullasherifi, Shevdini (or Shuisuri) and Sukri; in "Soran" on the other hand there is just the one taifa of Sorani Begzawada. The dual title of the Shevdini depends upon the context of reference. Shevdin is the name of the ancestor from whom all members of the Shevdini taifa nominally trace their descent, he was the 'founder' of the taifa; Shuisur on the other hand is the name of the district he came from. The Mullasherifi similarly all claim descent from a certain Mulla Sherif said to have been a member of the Galali tribe of Sulaimani district. In general the tendency seems to be to take the group name from the ancestor rather than the place. Ali Agha of Rayat in giving me his genealogy claimed that Shevdin had lived eight generations ago and that in those days his family had belonged to the Surchi tribe west of the Great Zab, and that they migrated to the east in search of better land.† It was interesting to note that Ali Agha was reluctant to admit that his taifa formed part of the Balik ashiret. With the loosening of the political ties that linked the three clans of the tribe he hoped soon to establish that the Shevdini were an ashiret in their own right. 614 619

* The same is not strictly true of the Sorani centred on Dergala. During the latter part of the 18th Century the name Soran was applied to a territory approximately corresponding to areas A and B of Map 1 over which the princes of Rowandus had established a titular suzerainty. Hamid Amin Beg the Agha of Dergala claims direct descent from these former princes and he and his immediate kin call themselves the Sorani Begzawada - "the descendants of the Begs of Soran". The term Soran has no direct territorial significance today, but on Map 2 the area so marked is that controlled by Hamid Amin Beg of Dergala.

† For comparison one may note that Sheikh Mohammad Agha of Walash, Agha paramount of the Balik and of the Mullasherifi taifa was also able to trace back his descent for eight generations but did not reach the name of Mulla Sherif in the process.

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

627 692 and honest administrator. The venality of the junior police officers has probably an important effect upon the economic status, and hence the influence of the Aghas. The position was put to me thus by Hamid Amin Agha of Dergala. "In the old days" he said "all my followers gave me presents; nowadays few can afford to, they must keep in well with the police and then they have nothing left for me".

622 721 In earlier times the taifa Agha was probably in a position to organise small scale military activities; even today this would appear to be partly true. I was told for instance that in 1936 Ali Agha of Rayat, head of the Shevdini, had led his men across the border and sacked a Persian police post in reprisal for the latter having impounded some of his clansmens' cattle. Naturally such incidents are strongly disapproved of by the authorities.

The Tribal Agha

• 619 622 "In the case of the Balik, as we have seen, the Agha of the largest taifa, Mullasherifi, is also Agha paramount of the whole tribe, and this is doubtless the normal rule. His function as tribal Agha does not ever seem to have amounted to very much except in time of war, in which case he automatically became leader of the whole group and doubtless received economic benefits accordingly. In time of peace he only receives small token payments, such as gifts of fruit and the like, from his more remote subordinates.

[714] The evidence concerning the actual behaviour of the Balik during the disturbed times of 1914-1920 is contradictory. Sheikh Mohammad asserts that he led his people to a victorious massacre of the invading Russian army; Hamid Amin of Nawpurdar on the other hand says that Sheikh Mohammad ran away and that it was he Hamid Amin who saved the remnants of the Balik from annihilation and finally routed the Russians. Whatever really happened, it seems clear that Sheikh Mohammad as head of the Mullasherifi ought to have led the Balik to war, whether he actually did so or not.

The first effect of contact with the external administration was certainly to increase the influence of the tribal Agha at the expense of his fellows. Thus Hay ingenuously remarks (p. 67) "The tribal chief has many obligations towards his tenants and tribesmen, the most important of which is that he will become their spokesman in all matters which concern the Government". The British

[731] "Hay (p. 68) states that it is the custom to present the paramount chief with a pregnant ewe from every considerable flock at the beginning of the year. Hay however makes no distinction between tribes and clans and the obligation may be towards the Agha of the taifa rather than the ashiret.

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

Administration moreover adopted the Turkish expedient of paying the tribal Aghas an annual salary provided they kept their tribe in order. This procedure undoubtedly gave the tribal Agha an altogether disproportionate economic influence, and has had various repercussions which will be discussed further in the next chapter.

The salary awarded to Sheikh Mohammad of Walash was stopped some years ago and, as might be expected, his influence as tribal leader declined rapidly. As is evidenced by the rival claims of the Aghas of Rayat and Rust noted above, the Balik has scarcely any functioning unity as a tribe at the present time, though Sheikh Mohammad with a wide sweep of his arm, still declares that all the land belongs to him and that the taifas of Shevdin and Sukr are only there on sufferance. At the present moment (1938) his prestige is probably on the upgrade since he has recently been appointed a "member of Parliament" and regularly attends the legislative assemblies in Baghdad. The appointment carries with it a small salary, but its real importance so far as the tribes are concerned is that it demonstrates that the holder is in favour with the Mutasarrif and with the Baghdad Authorities.

Kinship Structure

While I have here sketched out the superficial political structure of the community the real nature of the relationship between the various Aghas and their followers can only be understood in terms of kinship.

The essentially conditional nature of the Aghas' authority was only vaguely understood by the earlier British Administrators. Hay for instance remarks (p. 67) "The Aghas are very oppressive to their tenants, more especially where the Government is close at hand and can assert its authority. In the mountain districts the tribesmen are exceedingly poor, they have little to fear from the Government, and their chief finds it difficult to coerce them. A rival chief would probably soon appear if he did". This statement brings out the fact, already well known from examples in the African field, that Government support for "the Chief" frequently gives that individual a tyrannical authority quite foreign to the ordinary tribal system of government, but it does not explain the Agha's normal relationship to his followers.

Marriage of Commoners

As we have seen already the taifa is essentially a patrilineal clan. It is moreover largely endogamous by virtue of the system of ortho-cousin marriage common to most Mohammedan societies. Reference to the tables of Kinship Terminology at the end of this book

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

668 1. The Kurdish people in Iran should have freedom and self-government in the administration of their local affairs, and obtain autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State.
186 2. The Kurdish language should be used in education and be the official language in administrative affairs.
3. The provincial council of Kurdistan should be immediately elected according to constitutional law and should supervise and inspect all state and social matters.
4. All state officials must be of local origin.
5. A single law for both peasants and notables should be adopted and the future of both secured.
6. The Kurdish Democrat Party will make a special effort to establish unity and complete fraternity with the Azerbaijani people and the other peoples that live in Azerbaijan (Assyrians, Armenians, etc.) in their struggle.
7. The Kurdish Democrat Party will strive for the improvement of the moral and economic state of the Kurdish people through the exploration of Kurdistan's many natural resources, the progress of agriculture and commerce, and the development of hygiene and education.
8. We desire that the peoples living in Iran be able to strive freely for the happiness and progress of their country.

The manifesto ended in Soviet style with the words, "Long Live Kurdish Democratic Autonomy!"

668 The formation of the new party resulted in the dissolution of the Komala and the absorption of its members by the Democrats. Yet from the beginning the tribal chiefs, fearful of communism, were wary of the new party, though many signed a pledge of support presented them by a Soviet political officer touring the tribal areas. This underlying tribal opposition would have made Qazi Mohammad's position untenable had it not been for a fortuitous accession of strength which arrived from Iraq — Mulla Mustafa and his Barzanis.

668 The Barzanis had been even in Ottoman times one of the most troublesome of all the Kurdish tribes. In the 1920's Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan, considered a god by the Barzanis and neighboring 619 tribes, frequently rebelled against the British, who several times were forced to call in the R.A.F. Finally Sheikh Ahmad, his younger brother Mulla Mustafa, and his principal followers were exiled, first in southern Iraq, then in Suleimania. On June 11, 1942, Mulla Mustafa, who had taken over the leadership from his brother, escaped to Barzan.

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

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The story of Mulla Mustafa's subsequent struggle with the Iraqi Government, of how he twice defeated the Iraqi army in 1945, and how by judicious use of funds the Iraqi Minister of Interior was able to enlist other Kurdish tribes against him and drive him from Barzan, must be told at another time. Suffice it to say that on October 11, 1945, Mulla Mustafa, Sheikh Ahmad, and about 1,000 armed Barzanis and their families entered Iran at a point north of Ushnuieh. With them were a number of Iraqi petty officials and schoolteachers of Kurdish descent, and Kurdish deserters from the Iraqi army and gendarmerie, including twelve army officers. The latter were men of high caliber, several of whom had been trained in England and had held positions on the Iraqi general staff.

Shortly after his arrival in Iran, the Mulla met a number of Soviet officers, including the general commanding Soviet forces in western Azerbaijan. The Soviets told him to place himself under the orders of Qazi Mohammad, and ordered the local Kurds to feed and house the destitute Barzanis. By the end of October the Mulla's forces, swollen by refugees and adventurers from Iraq, numbered nearly 3,000 men armed with British rifles captured from the Iraqi army, machine guns, and one field piece.

THE KURDISH PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT

In November and early December, Soviet agents circulated among the tribes, telling them to mobilize for the coming struggle for independence and ordering the chiefs to assemble in Mahabad. All co-operated with the exception of the Mamesh, the Mangur, and the Dehbokri. Meanwhile in the rest of Azerbaijan the position of the Iranian Government was rapidly deteriorating. Armed "Democrats," many of them from Soviet Azerbaijan or the Caucasus, began to attack Iranian soldiers and gendarmes, who soon hardly dared leave their barracks. The whole province was in open "rebellion," while the Red Army stopped relief columns sent north by the Central Government to reinforce its hard-pressed garrisons. Finally, on December 10 the Democrats attacked the garrison in Tabriz and forced it to surrender. All eastern Azerbaijan then fell under the control of the newly-formed "Azerbaijan People's Government."

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

177 of its return. When the Kurds no longer hoped for this, and the
186 Iranians no longer feared it, there was no chance for Qazi Mo-
668 hammad's movement to survive.

The whole episode was a serious blow to the development of Kurdish nationalism. There is now no Komala and no Democrat Party of Kurdistan, and many of the potential leaders of the Kurds are dead, in prison, or in exile. Yet this does not mean that Kurdish nationalism is finished. The Kurdish Republic found its support among those progressive elements of the population which seem bound to increase in numbers and importance, and was opposed by those elements which seem destined to disappear. It remains to be seen whether Kurdish nationalism is practical in
186 an area where, until recently, nationalism was an unknown con-
619 ception and men still give primary allegiance to their religious and tribal chiefs. The Kurds have never been combined in a stable state of their own and enjoy no ancient unifying culture. Separated from each other by mountain barriers, they have always had to look for their cultural and economic needs to the capitals of the different states in which they have lived.

If the states the Kurds inhabit allow their Kurdish populations a degree of local autonomy and give up the attempt to force an alien nationalism upon them, they may succeed in obtaining a loyalty similar to that found in Switzerland with its multinational population. The Arab countries have made a start in this direction. A similar policy in Iran, if left free of foreign penetration, might be a cause of closer unity rather than of separatism between two of the nation's peoples.

habitat. Voices developed to shout from peak to peak across intervening valleys acquire inflexions to accentuate or suppress the echo of certain sounds, which can never be imitated by the plainsman.

There are about half a million Kurds in Iraq, a figure which represents only a fraction of the race; Turkey holds some three million and Iran at least one million. In the last-named country a reliable estimate is difficult to obtain owing to the widely separated areas reached by wandering tribes. Apart from those in the north-west, the mountainous country on the western border is peopled by Kurds as far south as Luristan. The north-eastern province of Khorasan also holds some Kurdish tribes; while certain tribes in Baluchistan may also be of Kurdish origin.

From the time when groups of Aryan-speaking families settled in secluded valleys until the present century, Kurdish tribes were cut off from each other and from the outside world by their mountains and by the fighting spirit of their primeval ancestors, who each regarded his own particular valley as his home, and any newcomer as an enemy who must be killed before he himself was overwhelmed. When man began to keep flocks and herds for domestic uses, the tribal exclusiveness was exaggerated by the need to prevent outsiders from sharing the limited areas of good grazing available among the rocky hills.

Intermarriage within the tribe has enhanced physical resemblances to such an extent that in many cases it is possible to distinguish a man's origin by his face as well as by the way he wears his headgear and his dialect. But there is no sign of this close blood-relationship having caused physical degeneration. The Kurd has been truly described as having the highest physical development of any race in the Middle East.

I have on occasion been out shooting with a Kurdish chief on the wrong side of seventy years of age, who rode a horse and

[p. 387 (A)]

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Kurd MA11

798 claim the right of wintering in the Christian villages of Armenia, and, as fanatical Moslems, they indulged on occasion in massacres of their unwilling Christian hosts—this often with the connivance or tacit approval of the Turks, who were not reluctant to see the Christian communities of Asia Minor decrease in numbers.

161 For obvious reasons, detailed figures as to the number of the Kurds are not available,[1] but estimates, some of them much out of date, give a total of some 3 millions, distributed as follows :

Turkey	1,250,000
Iraq (1924) . . .	494,000
Iran	700,000
Baluchistan . . .	350,000
Transcaucasian Russia (1911)	125,000
Syria	100,000
Afghanistan . . .	20,000

619 The Kurds cannot be said to have any advanced political feeling,
186 and, even less than the Badawin Arabs, have rarely been able to com-
648 bine for long in a stable, large-scale political organisation. Individual-ism and local tribal feeling are the chief characteristics. Kurdish political activity has been negative : that is, strongly against any other group that has tried to rule them, and their predilection tends to be anti-governmental, whatever the composition of the latter may be, rather than for pro-Kurdish aims. Since 1923 there have been ten serious revolts by the Kurds against various national governments—two against Turkey, four in Iran, and four in Iraq. One of these, in 1947, made use of weapons looted from Iranian military depots. Such revolts lend themselves to intervention by outside powers ; and an American view [2] is that a Kurdish revolt against Iran in 1942 had tacit support from Russia, with the aim of embarrassing the Iranian government. Little was finally achieved, however : one factor may have been the importance at the time of American lease-lend supplies to Russia, as the result of which the U.S. was able to exert some moderating influence on Russian policy.

668 Since 1927, a Kurdish independence movement, the ' Khoibun ', has been in existence, but its activities have hitherto had little success, the main obstacle being jealousy, division, and lack of co-operation
000 among the Kurds themselves. An attempt was made to enlist

[1] In modern Turkish statistics the Kurds are described as ' Mountain Turks '.
[2] That of Professor W. L. Westermann.

14: Ivanov E-5 (no date) 1926 MA1 Iran MA1
Kurd MA11

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174 now remain; there are only a few degenerate and impoverished families
162 in the south of the province, constituting a starving nomad tribe.
167 The Turks are still numerous, and there are many invaders of quite recent origin, such as the Kurds, who came here in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Timuris and the Baluchis, who extended their wanderings further and further north. The latest immigrants are Mongols, the so-called Barbaris, or Hazara, who are still continuing to come in numbers. It will be better to deal with each tribe separately.

K *Kurds.*—It is difficult to find if any Kurdish tribes were living in
101 Khurasan before the beginning of the sixteenth century. In the surnames
167 of many different celebrities who are natives of this province the term "Kurt" is often met with. Even a dynasty of this name ruled south of Herat in the hill districts (643–791 A.H., or 1245–1389 A.D.). Kurd and Kurt are undoubtedly the same as they are to-day; but if there had been some Kurdish people in Khurasan, they must have mixed with
168 Persians. When under the Safawides the necessity arose of defending the northern frontier of Khurasan against the inroads of the powerful Uzbegs and Turkomans, local means were not sufficient, and the Shahs tried to institute a measure similar to that of the Cossacks in Russia, *i.e.* they settled some warlike and virile people in the threatened area. Therefore some tribes of Kurds from Kurdistan proper were transferred
167 as early as the middle of the sixteenth century. In the beginning of the
177 seventeenth century a new party had arrived; some of these tribes still live there, like the Kaiwanlu, the Shadillu, etc. Some more of them arrived later on in the eighteenth century, under Nadir (like the 'Amarlu). At present there is no connection with the West, and the Khurasani Kurds are gradually undergoing "Turkomanization."

101 With regard to the racial and tribal names, it may be observed that
619 they are utterly unreliable for the purpose of establishing any conclusions
197 to ethnical connections. The tribe is usually called after the surname of the chief or of the place of settlement, and very soon the whole of the tribe, to which several sub-divisions belong, becomes named after the section which was most prominent and important among them. In practice there is nothing more difficult than obtaining exact information of the name of a tribe with its sub-divisions. In Khurasan the difficulty is still greater because there are no distinct sub-dialects, and the idiom of the Kurds appears practically uniform. Many sub-sections are closely connected with the Turks, and experience real difficulty in deciding whether they are of Kurdish or Turkish nationality.

These continual changes of names make it difficult to draw up a systematic table of sub-division. Of the four tribes which are traditionally regarded as the original, namely 'Amarlu, Za'faranlu, Shadillu and Kaiwanlu, the first and last appear to-day as small tribes, while the other two are mostly Turkish-speaking and have ceased to be regarded as Kurds.
000 The following list gives an approximate idea as to the present principal

14: Ivanov E-5 (no date) 1926 MA1 Iran MA1
Kurd MA11
Baluchi At2

K 731 164 This division[1] probably will not last long. The great famine and drought of 1916–1917 have greatly reduced the numbers of flocks, and the typhus and other epidemics have rendered many powerful tribes insignificant.

142 147 It is noticeable that a Khurasani Kurd differs in his physical structure from his kinsmen in the West, *i.e.* in the real Kurdistan, exactly as the Persian peasant of Khurasan differs from a western. The Khurasani Kurds are much taller and stronger, but their features are not so finely cut, and the facial angle is not as high as the one seen in the west. The Khurasani Kurds resemble Lurs more than the western Kurds in their physical type, although fair-haired individuals are much rarer amongst them.* They are a comparatively healthy race except in the vicinity of cities, where disease and opium smoking are frequent.

● 619 628 186 There is a great deal of unity between all these different tribes, and the feuds which are so common in Kurdistan proper apparently do not exist. Like all nomads, Kurds possess a greater national feeling than the settled Persians. There are apparently no great differences between the local idioms, and intercourse between tribes is very common; even intermarriage is very frequent.

197 191 The language of the Khurasani Kurds belongs to the so-called Northern or the real Kurdish family, and is connected with the dialect of the Mukris more than with any other known idiom. It has, however, several discrepancies from that original tongue. The Khurasani Kurdish is greatly influenced by the laws of the Khurasani Persian phonology. The vocabulary varies very much in different localities, and is either replete with Persian terms in the south, or with Turkish in the north. Many Kurdish families are bilingual, especially in the north, where they often speak better Turkish than Kurdish.

B 221 177 162 197 I 162 563 *Baluchis.*—This is another important tribe of Iranian origin living in Khurasan. They are nomads. Very rarely isolated families become settled, but in one or two generations they lose all connection with the Baluchis and become assimilated with the Persians. The Baluchis who extend their wanderings far to the north, live in the districts of Juwain, Nishapur, Turshiz, etc., and have already lost their original language. Further south their idiom resembles the original tongue, *i.e.* the Makrani dialect of Baluchi. Very little exact information about their language and folk-lore is available at present.

B 142 157 Physically Baluchis differ considerably from Persians and Kurds. They are usually much smaller, their features are not so regular, and their facial angle is often very sharp. They are an unsightly, lazy, apathetic people, although they possess much predatory spirit. Their seasonal † [between nomadic and sedentary way of life.—Analyst]

K 142 302 * The impression concerning this may not be correct, because the adults dye their hair with henna and always keep the head covered. But it seems that in Kurdistan proper one sees more numerous fair-haired children than in Khurasan; in the West they may be mistaken for Europeans.

4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Iraq Bedouin MHI
Kurd MHI

B 619 558 178 461 a severe slump in the camel market. Slowly and very reluctantly the bedouin are turning to cultivation and feel themselves immeasurably lowered in the process. Strangely enough, they are also to be found in greasy overalls, working on the rigs of the Mosul Oil Companies. In this work they do not lose caste as they do if they become cultivators.

B 69a Shaikh Ajil al Yawar is the paramount Shaikh of the 'Iraqi Shammar. He is an outstanding personality possessing a fine presence and a wonderful charm of manner. With singular astuteness he has managed to control his tribesmen, keep on the right side of successive governments and at the same time amass a considerable fortune for himself. During recent years his figure has perhaps suffered somewhat from the use of motor-cars instead of riding a fiery Arab steed or liver-shaking "dhillool" (trotting camel).

Turkomans

I 173 162 Leaving the Arabs, we come to the Turkomans. They are the remnants of ancient immigration and are to be found in Tel Affar town between Mosul and Sinjar and in a string of villages across to Altun Keupri and Kirkuk. Arbil is also largely a Turkoman town. The village of Nainawa, the ancient Nineveh, just across the Tigris from Mosul, is Turkoman. In a mosque built on unexcavated Assyrian remains it contains the reputed tomb of the prophet Jonah. The mosque is also said to contain a portion of the vertebræ of the whale!

Kurds

I 162 K 101 144 619 Next we come to the Kurds, who form by far the majority of the population of the mountain areas and who are also to be found in a large number of villages well south of the mountains. The Kurds are Aryan in origin and Sunni Muslims by religion. The mountain Kurds and in fact all the mountaineers of Kurdistan bear a close resemblance to the Scottish clans of two hundred years ago. They are still organized on a tribal or clan basis, though the increase in government control and influence is naturally tending to destroy this organization and undermine the power of the chiefs, or Aghas as they are called. Aghas may, however, still be seen proceeding to town or market with a "tail" of armed henchmen and even a pipebearer. The Kurdish pipebearer is, however, concerned with the Agha's tobacco pipe and not with music. Kurdish music is nevertheless played on a pipe

K 69a 657 644 276 619 ooo

 K

Kurdish music is nevertheless played on a pipe resembling the chanter of a bagpipe and has often a pleasant lilt. 534 535
Kurdish dancing, however, is by no means as strenuous as Scottish. Kurds and all other mountain dwellers in Kurdistan dance what is known as the chain-dance, similar to that which is, I believe, commonly seen in the Balkans. The dancers join hands and form a ring. The piper and a drummer with a sort of tenor drum stand in the middle, and the dance consists of fairly intricate footwork while the circle moves slowly round. Often star dancers who fancy themselves as budding Nijinskys do solo dances inside the circle. Amongst the Kurds the men and women dance separately, but with the Christian sects the two sexes dance together. This does not mean, however, that Kurdish women are completely segregated or kept by themselves. As a matter of fact, they possess considerable freedom and may be seen gathering firewood, tending animals or engaged in other tasks on the mountainside, often far from their villages. K [567]

Up to five years ago the Barzan district of Kurdistan retained all of its savage and primitive features. Government had not penetrated and Shaikh Ahmed, a religious fanatic, was dictator. With the help of his brothers and a standing army of several hundred men he completely dominated the impoverished inhabitants, who had the shaikh's bodyguard perpetually billeted on them and who had to provide them with food, clothing and tobacco and anything else they might fancy. Any protests on the part of the villagers were discouraged by the strongest methods. Such complete ascendancy did Shaikh Ahmed gain over his savage and illiterate people that they began to look upon him as a god and, though Muslims in name, turned their faces towards him in prayer rather than towards Mecca, as tradition demands. There was a Mullah in the district called Mullah Juj, who represented himself to be the prophet of this new god. The Mullah was a very fiery and eloquent speaker and, unfortunately for himself, his fame began to surpass even that of the deity. This could not of course be tolerated, and one of Shaikh Ahmed's brothers "bumped off" the presumptuous prophet. Up to that time the Koran had been revered, but now the Shaikh issued orders for the destruction of all copies to be found. He also withdrew the ban on the eating of pork, for wild pig were plentiful in Barzan. Armed missionaries were sent out beyond the Barzan bounds, and villages which refused to accept the Shaikh were burned and a number of the male inhabitants put to death. This state of affairs could not be allowed to continue, and the 'Iraq Government was forced to take action in conjunction with the British Royal Air Force. K 619 643 641 726 792 K [218] K 792 779 682 784 661 671 K [136] I K 721 657 648 K 697